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Tyler Close wrote,
> On Friday 03 October 2003 15:06, Rich Salz wrote:
> > In every case so far, it's been untested code paths. As others
> > have said, that's not ASN1/[BDPX]ER's fault.
>
> What if the design of ASN1/[BDPX]ER yields many more code paths
> than other designs? Is that a design flaw?
Arguably it might be if that were the case. Is it tho'? Can you show
that the design of ASN1/[BDPX]ER is such that all plausible
implementations must have "many" more code paths than a plausible
implementation of a validating XML parser (or XML+WXS, or XML+RNG, or
XML+RNG+XSD)? I'd be happy to be corrected, but _intutively_ I find
that somewhat implausible.
Personally, based on a mild acquaintance with with the OpenSSL source, I
think the bulk of the responsibility for the recent and not so recent
OpenSSL flaws lies neither with the design of ASN1/[BDPX]ER, nor with
sloppy coders, but with a large and by now somewhat crufty legacy
codebase.
Cheers,
Miles
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