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Indeed. The accronym that I find most useful when thinking about
security matters is CAIN :-
(C)onfidentiality (message encryption at the transport or message
(A)uthentication/Authorisation (various types of secure token e.g. certs)
(I)ntegrity (tamper-proofing - usually dig sig)
(N)on repudiation (usually dig sig)
So depending on what features you need (often more than one), select
On 14/07/06, Mitch Amiano <email@example.com> wrote:
> An encrypted file need not be signed at all, and a signed file need not
> be encrypted.
> The two things - signing and encrypting - are distinct operations.
> One you do to ensure no one can read the data that shouldn't be reading it.
> The other you do to ensure that no one has tampered with data that
> shouldn't be tampered with, while not necessarily encumbering the
> ability to read it.
> Now, I'm not a security expert. Someone with more experience in this
> area may correct me on this, and could speak to the issue a bit more
> But encryption alone is insufficient. One reason is that someone might
> well encrypt another file and substitute it for your original encrypted
> package. With a signature, both you and the receiver can perform a
> subsequent test that the signature and file still match up. Of course,
> if the signature is also with the original data, and that's your only
> copy, then someone could replace the signature too. Even if not, you or
> the receiver could conceivably maliciously replace both the file and
> the signature, thus creating an uncertainty about whose copy is authentic.
> Dave Pawson wrote:
> > On Fri, 2006-07-14 at 13:21 -0400, Mitch Amiano wrote:
> >> https lets you send the data within a stream of packets of encrypted data.
> >> The signature gives you confidence that an unencrypted packet of data
> >> hasn't been altered.
> >> To take a document and encrypt it, so it is unreadable without
> >> decrypting, you could use encryption software such as GNU Privacy Guard
> >> or an API's crypt function.
> > Would this be prior to or after 'signing' it?
> > If xml-sig is an analogy of an sha1sum, surely after?
> > I guess a 'standard' crypt library is good enough for data protection
> > act, due care etc;
> > though I do need one for a Java client and Microsoft server (which
> > doesn't make
> > for an easy life :-)
> > regards
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