Re: [cti-taxii] Tuesday's Working Call

From
Jason Keirstead <>
Date
2017-01-30T22:43:16+00:00
ID
Thread
Re: [cti-taxii] Tuesday's Working Call
I added the same comments in the document. 

My suggest to fix it, as echoed by many at the face to face, is to entirely delete this section... I feel it is unnecessary in its entirety and is only going to cause implementation issues. I did not want to make this change however.

--
Sent from my mobile device, please excuse any typos.

Bret Jordan --- Re: [cti-taxii] Tuesday's Working Call --- 

From:"Bret Jordan" <>

To:"Jason Keirstead" <>

Cc:

Date:Mon, Jan 30, 2017 6:22 PM

Subject:Re: [cti-taxii] Tuesday's Working Call

Jason,

Thanks for pointing that out.  Please make suggestions in the document that will fix this.

Bret

From: Jason Keirstead <>
Sent: Monday, January 30, 2017 7:42:17 AM
To: Bret Jordan
Cc: 
Subject: Re: [cti-taxii] Tuesday's Working Call
 

My main questions on the doc as it stands right now... added the same comments directly to the doc.

Here is a copy/paste from the doc - red emphasis mine (apologies to anyone on a plain-text email client)

6.4.1​ Certificate Authentication
A TAXII 2.0 Server MAY support certificate authentication. Software
claiming to support certificate authentication
MUST follow the normative requirements listed in this section.

What is the normative definition of "claiming to support" ?

Am I allowed to build software that supports pinned certificates, but does not support CRLs? Because by my reading, I could not do that.

-
Jason Keirstead
STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems
www.ibm.com/security|
www.securityintelligence.com

Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown 

From:        Bret Jordan <>
To:        "" <>
Date:        01/28/2017 02:04 PM
Subject:        [cti-taxii] Tuesday's Working Call
Sent by:        <>

I would like to discuss the authentication and certificate pieces on this Tuesday's working call. We seem to have a divide in the community about what to do here.  Some are saying we should be completely silent, others are saying
 we should define it because otherwise the only interoperability we will have is a "best practice".

The group seems to be divided nearly 50/50.  What I am going to propose is that we put things like the certificate authentication and certificate handing parts in the "Optional Features" part of the Conformance Section.  This would
 allow us to specify exactly how it should be done, if you decide to implement it.   We need to make sure we take in to account cloud services that may not give you a lot of flexibility over the stack that you are using.  But I think we can solve this.

So if you have opinions on this topic, please join us on this weeks working call.

Thanks
Bret