Hi Trey,
I'm not sure this dialogue is relevant to this list.
Something is getting lost in translation here.
It seems unfair to be excising a quote from a
1989 RFC about much of anything concerning
the DARPA Internet when the design purpose
was to support the NREN, not large-scale public
infrastructure - which was being attempted
over in the OSI Internet venues. I have otherwise
no quibble with Thompson's contemporary draft.
With that said, Jon's observations in Sec. 1.2.2
apart from the quote -about assuming all code is
flawed - is rather interesting if not prescient, e.g.,
In general, it is best to assume that the
network is filled with malevolent entities
that will send in packets designed to have
the worst possible effect. This assumption
will lead to suitable protective design,
The statement could well be a CTI mantra.
-tony
On 2015-07-09 09:05 AM, Trey Darley wrote:
