+1
Dan Weinreb wrote:
>
> Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2001 09:54:15 -0400
> From: christopher ferris <>
>
> A NRR *may* not be meaningful in a legal sense unless it is
> signed by an authorized signer. The private key for the certificate
> that is authorized *may* not be available to the MSH for security
> reasons.
>
> This is why it is my strong belief that NRR is an "application"
> function.
>
> I agree with you, but I think there is an additional argument that NRR
> must be an "application" function, independent of the question of the
> handling of the private keys.
>
> If an NRR is not application-level, then presumably the NRR merely
> means that the message reached the MSH of the To Party, i.e. that the
> message was delivered into a persistent queue at the To Party, or
> something like that.
>
> If that's all that the NRR means, it seems to me that it's not
> terribly useful. Suppose party F sends a message to party T, and gets
> back such an NRR. Later there is a dispute, and F wants to "prove"
> (introduce evidence that) T really did "receive" the message, and so
> it introduces the signed NRR as evidence. T replies that, well, yes,
> the message did get into its MSH, but T never actually processed the
> incoming message; it was just sitting there on the disk somewhere and
> nobody ever actually looked at it. In this way T can effectively
> repudiate the message in spite of the existence of a signed NRR.
> So the signed NRR really doesn't help F; he might as well not have
> it at all.
