RE: [saml-dev] Subject confirmation.

From
Giuseppe Sarno <>
Date
2005-11-10T14:19:59+00:00
ID
Thread
RE: [saml-dev] Subject confirmation.
Title: Message

Hi,

it 
will probably take sometime to digest this, but you gave me some good thoughts 
and material to go through.

It 
looks like this is an important feature in SAML.

 

Many 
thanks in the mean time for you help. 

 

  

  
-----Original Message-----
From: Conor P. Cahill 
  [mailto:] 
Sent: 10 November 2005 
  14:03
To: Sarno, Giuseppe [MOP:GM15:EXCH]
Cc: 
  
Subject: RE: [saml-dev] Subject 
  confirmation.

Giuseppe Sarno wrote on 11/10/2005, 8:35 
  AM: 
  

  
  
    
AP could 
    include a HolderKey confirmation method + 
    key.

    
This means 
    that the Party A should prove somehow that he holds that key (by enc/decryp 
    a message or the NameID itself or by any other mean) with the 
    RP.

    
(this where 
    it gets a little bit confuse, how the PartyA proves he holds the 
    key)

    
I guess 
    though this must be out of the scope of SAML. (if you have an example it 
    would be helpful)
The best example would be the proposed SAML 
  token profile v1.1 for WSS (available at: http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/15256/Web%20Services%20Security%20SAML%20Token%20Profile-11.pdf)

  
    
For the 
    Subject in the Confirmation, sorry I didn't mean subject but 
    BaseID/NameID/Enc...ID instead. They are present at the Subject level as 
    well as the SubjectConfirmation 
  level.
In the Subject Confirmation, this is the 
  identity of the *entity* that is able to do the confirmation, if 
  available.  In your example, Party A would be the entity sending the 
  message to RPA and would be identified with an ID in the subject 
  confirmation.  Of course, if Party A was a browser, it doesn't have a 
  unique identity and so  there would be no identity there in such a 
  case.

  
    
But looking 
    at the schema I assume that those will be included in the confirmation only 
    if they are not present at the  Subject 
    level.
That's not the case.  They ID's identify 
  different parties (the Subject vs the entity that can meet the confirmation 
  requirements). 

In our model, the SubjectConfirmation IDs 
  (SCIDs) would not be present during browser based SSO or with tokens issued to 
  intelligent clients (active participants in the SSO process),  when 
  either client communicates with a relying party.  But later, when that 
  relying part turns around and invokes another service that is part of the same 
  "session" with the Subject, the token that they get to invoke the subsequent 
  service will include the identiy of the relying party in the SCID).  So 
  we will have tokens with or without SCIDs depending upon the 
  context.

Conor