RE: Comments on Core 12

From
Hallam-Baker, Phillip <>
Date
2001-08-07T17:49:13+00:00
ID
Thread
RE: Comments on Core 12
Title: Comments on Core 12

 

 

Phillip Hallam-Baker FBCS C.Eng.
Principal 
Scientist
VeriSign Inc.

781 245 6996 
x227

  
-----Original Message-----
From: Tim Moses 
  [mailto:]
Sent: Friday, August 03, 2001 2:54 
  PM
To: 'OASIS Security Services group'
Subject: Comments 
  on Core 12

  
Colleagues - I have the following 
  observations/comments/questions on Core 12.  Best regards.  
  Tim. 

  
1 (major). Section 1.  Definition of Authentication 
  assertion.  This definition is a bit limiting.  How about ... " ... 
  an assertion by the issuer that the subject was authenticated by a particular 
  means at a particular time, and including information by which a relying party 
  can confirm that an entity claiming to be the subject of the assertion is, 
  indeed, the subject.  The assertion may (but does not have to) include a 
  name for the subject.  The assertion may (but does not have to) contain 
  authentication information by which the relying party can authenticate the 
  subject.  In the case of a bearer token, the authentication information 
  may be missing.  In which case, the relying party must deduce from the 
  environment that the presenter of the assertion is the subject." 

I 
thought the 2nd ammendment was about bearing arms, not 
assertions

I agree up to the point where bearer assertions 
are mentioned, I think they should simply be one AuthenticationCode 
mechanism 

  
2 (minor). Section 1.  Attribute assertion.  Is 
  there a reason for saying "is associated with", instead of "possesses"?  
  "Possesses" seems more straight-forward. 

Aggh, I didn't like the wording, I don't think 
possesses captures the meaning either. 

  
3 (major). Section 1.2.  We should allow an 
  AssertionSpecifier to be verifiably-linked to a specific assertion, i.e. it 
  may be a digest of the assertion.  This is hinted at in 1.1.1.1.  
  However, for the linkage to be verifiable, we need identifiers for the 
  specifier type and the digest algorithm. 

I 
would be happy to agree to something like that. It was only left out 
because it was not brought up in the TC. 

  
4 (major). Section 1.3.2.1.  We should allow the 
  authenticator to be a digest of a data object (e.g. XML document), then we can 
  attach assertions to objects. 

 Steve raised the same point, that would be 
another Identifier to define in section 4:

4.1.7 
Object Authenticator (SHA-1)

If 
someone writes the text I can put it in. 

  
5 (minor). Section 1.3.2.1.  Can we be more specific 
  about the use of "AuthData"?  

The idea 
is that the use of the field is specified mechanism by mechanism in section 
4. 

It 
should be AuthenticationData however...

  
6 (minor). Section 1.4.1.  The "AuthenticationCode" and 
  "Audience" elements, together, serve the same purpose that the 
  "certificatePolicies" extension of X.509 serves.  Can be learn anything 
  from the experience with X.509? 

Oh 
I think we did :-) 

  
7 (minor). Section 1.4.1.  Why did we choose the term 
  "AuthenticationLocale"?  Aren't we actually identifying the 
  authentication authority?  So, isn't that a more appropriate term? 

 Whatever.

  
8 (major). Section 1.5.1.1.  We should allow the "object" 
  element to contain a digest of a data object, or the object itself. 

Could do, I don't see why not. Might be additional 
reason to do the reorg suggested by David O. 

  
9 (minor). Section 1.6.1.1.  Does the syntax express the 
  relationship that there can be one or more attributes, each with zero or more 
  values? 

 Yes

  
10 (major). Section 1.7.2.  "Audience" should be able to 
  specify a "use", as well as a "community".  

Could 
reword, the intention is that the Audience can be specified to be the 
people who agree to use the assertion for a particular 
use. 

  
11 (major). Section 2.2.2.  I believe there are 
  circumstances under which the SAML request must convey "both" an assertionID 
  and a query.  I have an outstanding action to explain where this need 
  arises. 

OK. will wait for the 
explanation 

  
12 (major). Section 2.3.1.  I believe the requester needs 
  an opportunity to specify the authentication protocols that it supports and 
  the space in which the subject's name should be expressed. 

I 
have no reall objections, but it is an addition 

  
13 (minor). Section 2.4.  Delete: "The response will be 
  in the form of an Attribute Assertion", and replace it with "A successful 
  response will be in the form of one or more Attribute Assertions". 

OK 

  
14 (major). Section 2.4.1.  As currently defined, the 
  "CompletenessSpecifier" is redundant.  The requester can only ask for the 
  set of attributes that it is qualified to receive.  So, there is no need 
  to specify behaviour in the event that there are other attributes that it is 
  not qualified to receive. 

See other post 

  
15 (major). Section 2.5.  The PEP should be able to 
  supply additional information, possibly in the form of "environmental 
  assertions" upon which the PDP may base its decision. 

I 
think that the 'evidence' approach is much more general than just for 
Authorization queries and could well be promoted higher in the hierarchy so 
any query could specify supporting assertions. 

 

  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
--------------- 
Tim Moses 
  
Tel: 613.270.3183 

Phillip Hallam-Baker (E-mail).vcf