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RE: [security-services] HolderOfKey and SenderVouches are slippin gthru the cracks(!)
Title: RE: [security-services] HolderOfKey and SenderVouches are slippin g thru the cracks(!) I agree with Prateek. I think a confirmation method should be defined in the Profile that uses it. BTW, I made this comment some time ago, but I will repeat it. The description of Holder-of-Key is wrong. If you look up ds:KeyInfo you will see thaat it is not "Any cryptographic key", it is specifically a Public Key. I think the description should read something like: "The subject of the assertion is the party that can demonstrate that it knows the value of the private key that corresponds to the Public Key specified in <ds:KeyInfo> of the enclosing <SubjectConfirmation> element, by means of the procedures implied by the particular KeyInfo format chosen." The reason is that an X.509 cert implies X.509 processing, a PGP key ring implies PGP processing and so forth. Hal > -----Original Message----- > From: Mishra, Prateek [mailto:] > Sent: Thursday, April 04, 2002 4:59 PM > To: '' > Cc: > Subject: RE: [security-services] HolderOfKey and SenderVouches are > slippin g thru the cracks(!) > > > Jeff, > > one reason I had not included these identifiers was that the > SOAP Profile > document is now available. My own preference (given that > these identifiers > only make sense in the context of a particular > profile construction) would be to include them in the next > rev of the the > SOAP > profile document. > > - prateek > > >>-----Original Message----- > >>From: Jeff Hodges [mailto:] > >>Sent: Thursday, April 04, 2002 4:54 PM > >>To: > >>Subject: [security-services] HolderOfKey and SenderVouches > >>are slipping > >>thru the cracks(!) > >> > >> > >>An apparent side-effect of our placing the responsibility > for defining > >>ConfirmationMethod identifiers with SAML profiles and > >>bindings is having the > >>HolderOfKey and SenderVouches ConfirmationMethods sort of > disappear. > >> > >>The are not mentioned in Prateek's proposed changes to > >>bindings-model-13... > >> > >>Proposed changes to bindings-13 to includedefinition of SAML > >>Confirmation > >>Method identifiers > >>http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/security-services/200204/ > >>msg00013.html > >> > >>Note that we explicitly listed them among the four > >>ConfirmationMethods we felt > >>we wanted to retain.. > >> > >>Minutes for Focus Group Telecon Tue 2-Apr -2002 > >>http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/security-services/200204/ > >>msg00007.html > >> > >> > >>> Presently defined & employed ConfirmationMethods (and attendant > >>> SubjectConfirmationData values) will be defined in > >>appropriate places in the > >>> subsequent version of bindings-model-xx, and it'll also > >>have a (sub)section > >>> summarizing the presently defined & employed > ConfirmationMethods... > >>> holderOfKey > >>> bearer > >>> sender vouches > >>> artifact > >> > >> > >>This situation is likely due to there not being an obvious place in > >>bindings-model-13 to define holderOfKey and SenderVouches. > >> > >>Additionally, we'd agreed that there ought to be a summary > >>section (appendix?) > >>that lists all the ConfirmationMethods defined in the spec. > >> > >>A proposal to solve this is to concot a short, specific > >>subsection of section 3 > >>"Bindings" (3.2, say) along the lines of.. > >> > >> > >>3.2 ConfirmationMethod Identifiers > >> > >>Assertions returned by SAML responders in response to any > >>SAML requests MAY > >>contain ConfirmationMethod identifiers defined in this > >>subsection, or MAY > >>contain ConfirmationMethod identifiers defined elsewhere in > >>this specification > >>(e.g. in profiles), or MAY contain ConfirmationMethod > >>identifiers defined in > >>other specification or by private agreement. Use and > interpretation of > >>ConfirmationMethod identifiers is profile- or > >>application-specific. See > >> > >> > >>3.2.1 Holder of Key: > >> > >> URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:Holder-Of-Key > >> > >> <ds:KeyInfo>: Any cryptographic key > >> > >> The subject of the assertion is the party that can > >>demonstrate that it > >> is the holder of the private component of the key specified > >>in <ds:KeyInfo> > >> of the enclosing <SubjectConfirmation> element. > >> > >> > >>3.2.2 Sender Vouches: > >> > >> URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:sender-vouches > >> > >> Indicates that no other information is available about the > >>context of > >> use of the assertion. The Relying party SHOULD utilize > >>other means to > >> determine if it should process the assertion further. > >> > >> > >> > >>...and add this appendix near the end of the spec.... > >> > >> > >> > >>X Appendix: ConfirmationMethods summary > >> > >>These confirmation methods are defined in this specificaiton: > >> > >> Identifier See section > >> ---------- ----------- > >> > >> urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:Holder-Of-Key 3.2.1 > >> > >> urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:sender-vouches 3.2.2 > >> > >> urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:Artifact-01 4.1.1.1 > >> > >> urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:Bearer 4.1.2.1 > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>----- > >>JeffH > >> > >>---------------------------------------------------------------- > >>To subscribe or unsubscribe from this elist use the subscription > >>manager: <http://lists.oasis-open.org/ob/adm.pl> > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > To subscribe or unsubscribe from this elist use the subscription > manager: <http://lists.oasis-open.org/ob/adm.pl> >
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