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RE: [security-services] sstc-bindings-extensions-02

From
Jahan Moreh <>
Date
2003-04-07T22:06:56+00:00
ID
Thread
RE: [security-services] sstc-bindings-extensions-02
Title: Message

Prateek and Scott - 

Proving a credential 
collector's authenticity is a complex matter. My intention was to bring our flow 
up to par with existing web browser-to-server practices, which basically depend 
on the user to verify the server's authenticity via SSL/TLS before 
providing credentials. 

 

Now, the question is do 
we normatively specify SSL/TLS or do we just discuss it in subsection on 
security considerations. My inclination is that we normatively specify this in 
the form of a "SHOULD" and also discuss it in the subsection on security 
consideration.

 

 

Thanks,

Jahan

 

----------------
Jahan Moreh
Chief Security 
Architect
310.286.3070 

  
-----Original Message-----
From: Mishra, Prateek 
  [mailto:]
Sent: Monday, April 07, 2003 3:00 
  PM
To: ''; ''
Cc: 
  
Subject: FW: 
  [security-services] sstc-bindings-extensions-02

  
Jahan,

  
    
 

    
There is another 
    area that I thought we can discuss over email and that this calling out 
    SSL/TLS in the proposed profiles. Basically, by using SSL we will prevent a 
    malicious destination from colluding with a malicious source to steal  
    a user's credentials. I.e., if the destination redirects the user to a 
    source that cannot prove authenticity under SSL, then the user should not 
    provide his uid/password. This is consistent with our current 1.0 browser 
    profiles that envision source-site-first flow.

    
 

    

    
<Prateek>
my problem here is that this is 
    something the user must do: check to verify that the source site is in 
    fact the site he/she expects it to be and perhaps demand that the site 
    authenticate itself to the user before presenting credentials to  
    the site (.e.g, server-side SSL). In other words, this does not 
    have impact on our steps (1)-(4) but only on the relationship between the 
    user and the source site. I can note this in the threat and counter-measure 
    section but I am not sure I can say anything more than that, or, can 
    I?

    
 

    
</Prateek>

    
 

    
 

    
 

    
 

    
 

    
----------------
Jahan Moreh
Chief Security 
    Architect
310.286.3070 

    
      
-----Original Message-----
From: Mishra, Prateek 
      [mailto:]
Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2003 
      12:43 PM
To: 
      ''
Subject: 
      [security-services] sstc-bindings-extensions-02

      
This documen updates the "Destination Site 
      First" flows published by Scott Cantor in a 

      
message sent 
      on

      
 

      
Tuesday, March 
      18 with Subject:Updated core/bindings with dest site first (no March 
      archives are available)

      
 

      
I have added a 
      GET-oriented flow from the destination site to the source site. It follows 
      Scott's POST-based flows very closely; for some required values I have 
      chosen fixed-size strings in place of the unbounded strings used in 
      the POST case. Other than that, the two flows are quite 
      similar.

      
 

      
 

      
- 
      prateek
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