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RE: [security-services] sstc-bindings-extensions-02
Title: Message
Prateek and Scott -
Proving a credential
collector's authenticity is a complex matter. My intention was to bring our flow
up to par with existing web browser-to-server practices, which basically depend
on the user to verify the server's authenticity via SSL/TLS before
providing credentials.
Now, the question is do
we normatively specify SSL/TLS or do we just discuss it in subsection on
security considerations. My inclination is that we normatively specify this in
the form of a "SHOULD" and also discuss it in the subsection on security
consideration.
Thanks,
Jahan
----------------
Jahan Moreh
Chief Security
Architect
310.286.3070
-----Original Message-----
From: Mishra, Prateek
[mailto:]
Sent: Monday, April 07, 2003 3:00
PM
To: ''; ''
Cc:
Subject: FW:
[security-services] sstc-bindings-extensions-02
Jahan,
There is another
area that I thought we can discuss over email and that this calling out
SSL/TLS in the proposed profiles. Basically, by using SSL we will prevent a
malicious destination from colluding with a malicious source to steal
a user's credentials. I.e., if the destination redirects the user to a
source that cannot prove authenticity under SSL, then the user should not
provide his uid/password. This is consistent with our current 1.0 browser
profiles that envision source-site-first flow.
<Prateek>
my problem here is that this is
something the user must do: check to verify that the source site is in
fact the site he/she expects it to be and perhaps demand that the site
authenticate itself to the user before presenting credentials to
the site (.e.g, server-side SSL). In other words, this does not
have impact on our steps (1)-(4) but only on the relationship between the
user and the source site. I can note this in the threat and counter-measure
section but I am not sure I can say anything more than that, or, can
I?
</Prateek>
----------------
Jahan Moreh
Chief Security
Architect
310.286.3070
-----Original Message-----
From: Mishra, Prateek
[mailto:]
Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2003
12:43 PM
To:
''
Subject:
[security-services] sstc-bindings-extensions-02
This documen updates the "Destination Site
First" flows published by Scott Cantor in a
message sent
on
Tuesday, March
18 with Subject:Updated core/bindings with dest site first (no March
archives are available)
I have added a
GET-oriented flow from the destination site to the source site. It follows
Scott's POST-based flows very closely; for some required values I have
chosen fixed-size strings in place of the unbounded strings used in
the POST case. Other than that, the two flows are quite
similar.
-
prateek
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