Scott Cantor wrote on 8/25/2004, 2:03 PM:
>
> That's not a threat in SAML (at least not precisely that one) because the
> location to which the response can be delivered with the profile is in
> the
> signed response ( though in 2.0, it's in the assertion's subject
> confirmation data). This wasn't done in ID-FF because the POST profile
> there
> forked off before it was addressed in 1.0.
So here's how it's an issue:
We have the following parties:
* BadProvider - the guy who's being nasty
* IdP - the good Identity provider
* SP - the good Service Provider
* Principal -
So, the Principal somehow browses to BadProvider... BadProvider submits
an AuthNRequest to IdP claiming he is SP and providing a consumerURL
that points back to a BadProvider managed location. The IdP sends
the response back to BadProvider at this location (and in this case
we are doing a browser-post type operation, not artifact).
BadProvider can then act as a *browser* client of SP and submits the
assertion as a response to the consumer URL of SP and now SP will let
the BadProvider act as a bad guy on its site.
So, the IdP shouldn't use a consumer URL unless there is some reason
for it to trust it (either a signed request from a trusted party, or
because of some trusted metadata or some other such equivalent).
Conor
