Comments on Attribute Sharing Profile for X.509 Authentication-Based Systems (draft 10)

Title: Message

Tom, here are some 
comments. In general, I like how you've reworked the 
sections.

 

1. line 183: s/value 
of/value is/

 

2. line 249: 
s/5.2.2/4.2.2/

 

3. lines 379-381 and 
423-425 -- I suggest that you remove these lines. When using metadata, the 
use="encryption" attribute is typically used for including a public key or X509 
certificate (for example) that is used by the metadata user to encrypt a 
symmetric key. The symmetric key is *not* a previously established key. Actually 
if you did have a previously established key, you would not need to encrypt it 
(as it would not be sent over the wire).

 

4. lines 392 and 439 
(in relation to the above stmts) s/encrypt symmetric keys/encrypt previously 
established symmetric keys/

 

5. line 
481-486  Add the following thought somehow. Basically, transport-level 
security alone will not provide SAML message authentication of the sending 
party. I.e., a receiver can authenticate any requesting party it trusts and 
that will provide confidentiality and message integrity. However, it does 
not satisfy the requirement that the message (SAML xml content) sent is in 
fact coming from the authenticated requester. For example if the receiver trusts 
requester A and requester B. What if requester A sends a SAML message stating 
that its IssuerName is that of requester B. Strictly tranport-level security 
would not suffice. So either XML signatures is required or SAML message 
authentication is required.

So for Enhanced 
Mode, transport level security would not suffice in single-hop scenarios (the 
current text implies it would be ok -- and the need for dig signatures is really 
because of the possibilitly of multi-hop scenarios).

 

Tom.

Thomas Wisniewski
Software Architect 
Phone: 
(201) 891-0524 
Cell: (201) 248-3668 

  
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