Here are my additional comments:
line 253 - any additional security requirements for attachments (mime) to secure the attachment(s) ?
line 738 - should we use a ws-securitypolicy to indicate a security (security profile) and not just the uri ?
line 1105 - seem there will be an interop issue if we let folks decide on what mechanisms to use for authentication, seems that we should just state what is acceptable in the security profile that is required to be supported
line 1131 - I think that R4035 should be removed as we don't yet have a profile that has multiple credentials, we need make sure we have a set of requirements that cover the profile
line 1146 - I think that we should state the "credentials of the client or device" or make sure that the profile we have for SSL/TLS covers multiple credentials
line 1151 - should add SSL also
line 1155 - we should be specific here as this could be basic authn or some form of SSL/TLS mutual authn
line 1159 - should the the same session that was used to negotiate a secure session be used ?
line 1174 - R4046 for interop we should just stick with TLS certificate authn, this goes back to having a profile and a set of requirements for that profile, some of these requirements are too framework like and don't get us to an interop point
line 1212 - I think that we should limit this to SSL/TLS as I could use a proprietary secure channel and we would not get interop
line 1126 - I think we should just have a requirement that lists the unsupported cipher suites for SSL/TLS
Basically I think we need to have a section for a mandatory (if you want security)secure profile and then have the requirements that cover that secure profile as this is still trying to cover a framework for security
Anthony Nadalin | Work 512.838.0085 | Cell 512.289.4122
Dan Driscoll ---01/07/2009 11:18:51 PM---Thanks for the feedback, Antoine!
From:
Dan Driscoll <>
To:
"" <>, "" <>
Date:
01/07/2009 11:18 PM
Subject:
RE: [ws-dd] DPWS Security changes
Thanks for the feedback, Antoine!
I incorporated all changes except a few minor notes:
* One comment you had said that we should distinguish "DEVICE" by saying "DEVICEs that conform to this security profile." If we did, I think we would have to change most (all?) instances in this section--I think it is far more effective to allow the composition text at the beginning make it clear: all of Section 7 is optional and must be applied in entirety.
* The case of an unsecure DEVICE and a secure HOSTED SERVICE is an unusual one, and in cases where it's used, I think we should classify that as a separate security profile entirely, instead of trying to accommodate it in this profile.
Everyone, please see the updated text. You may reply with the original text, or this one--if you haven't yet started reviewing, please use the latest version.
Issues addressed in this draft:
032: Describe security composability
051: Generalize security
112: Remove WS-Security reference
113: Cleanup Network Model
114: Remove security negotiation
115: Replace R4070 with switches on HTTPS ID/xAddrs
138: Create introduction and concrete description of security profile
139: Remove protocol negotiation
140: Clean up HTTP Authentication
Thanks
--D
-----Original Message-----
From: Antoine Mensch [mailto:]
Sent: Monday, January 05, 2009 4:27 AM
To:
Subject: Re: [ws-dd] DPWS Security changes
Hi Dan and all,
Please find enclosed a version of the document annotated with comments.
As the comments author is lost when saving the doc, I have prefixed all my comments with AM. Besides minor editorial issues, I have two major concerns with the current version:
1) it does not really clarify the security model for HOSTED SERVICEs:
most requirements still refer to DEVICEs, although the spec mentions that control and eventing messages (that normally apply to HOSTED
SERVICEs) should use the Secure Channel established for the DEVICE. I think the intent is that HOSTED SERVICEs delegate the establishment the security association to the DEVICE and then use the secure channel established between DEVICE and CLIENT, but it should be made clearer in the spec.
2) The removal of requirements R4028 and R4069 adds uncertainty to the
spec: it becomes more difficult to understand with feature is optional and which one is mandatory. I think we should explicitly say that TLS with both server and client certificates is the preferred approach, but that HTTP Basic Authentication can be used as a mandatory minimal fallback mechanism when client certificates are not practically feasible.
Cheers
Antoine
Dan Driscoll a 嶰rit :
>
> Hi all-
>
> Please see my proposed changes for the DPWS Security issues. The
> following issues are addressed in this proposal:
>
> * 032: Describe security composability
> * 112: Remove WS-Security reference
> * 113: Cleanup Network Model
> * 114: Remove security negotiation
> * 115: Replace R4070 with switches on HTTPS ID/xAddrs
> * 138: Create introduction and concrete description of security
> profile
> * 139: Remove protocol negotiation
> * 140: Clean up HTTP Authentication
>
>
>
> Note that although change tracking is enabled, the document is much
> easier to read with tracking disabled.
>
>
>
> Thanks
>
> --D
>
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