Next in thread → Next in month →

RE: [wss] KERBEROS - Derriving session keys from master secret

From
Tim Alsop <>
Date
2004-04-23T08:50:20+00:00
ID
Thread
RE: [wss] KERBEROS - Derriving session keys from master secret
Title: RE: [wss] KERBEROS - Derriving session keys from master secret

I am sorry to join this discussion at a late stage, but I am not clear what you mean by "master secret" ? You seem to be implying that a Kerberos service ticket contains a master, long term secret and cannot, or should not be used for authentication and encryption ? If so, then I disagree with this.

Thanks, Tim. 

-----Original Message-----

From: Hallam-Baker, Phillip [mailto:] 

Sent: 22 April 2004 17:34

To: 

Subject: [wss] KERBEROS - Derriving session keys from master secret

We need to specify how to use a secret bound in a kerb ticket for encryption

and authentication.

This has two parts, first nit picky issues like byte ordering, second

sub-key derrivation.

The secret contained in a kerb ticket is a master secret, it should never be

used to encrypt or authenticate data directly, it should only be used in a

secure fashion to create the session keys used for actual processing.

In the case of encryption SOME algorithms have an IV, others do not. If some

looser were to encrypt two pieces of data with the same key under RC4 there

is a simple cryptanalytic attack for recovering the message data:

        [C1 = M1 XOR S, C2 = M2 XOR S => C1 XOR C2 = M1 XOR M2 XOR S XOR S =

M1 XOR M2

        where S = E(k), the stream cipher cipher stream]

In the case of MAC algorithms the message encryption layers do not specify

any key freshening scheme.

As I see it the question is to what extent we want to protect loosers from

loosing by making the scheme foolproof.

A simple key derrivation scheme would be the sender specifies a random XOR

mask to be used to freshen the master secret. This is secure but only if the

XOR mask is strong. A stronger scheme is to use some form of cryptographic

primitive such as a hash so we guarantee the derrived key is secure. 

To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the roster of the OASIS TC), go to http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/wss/members/leave_workgroup.php.
Next in thread → Next in month →