legalxml-courtfiling — archive

[John Messing]

I think Allen brings up a very good point. I suppose at one level since the service of pleadings or other documents is optional under this OXCI proposal, a court could just choose not to provide it. At another level, if objects are updating the CMS' automatically at both ends of the pipeline as Dallas envisions, then the issues become: first, who is responsible for monitoring the automated processes to make sure all goes as expected and for issuing the certificates of service as proof the data was properly sent and received? Secondly,what signature technology is used as proof of authority and authenticity of these events? Assuming a business decision were reached by a court to be the responsible entity for service results, and a clerk was selected to sign certificates of service on its behalf, would it be correct to conclude that a court could not accomplish this feat technically because there is no security through signature technology assumed by, allowed for, or enabled on the court side of this proposed version of OXCI? Are there any restrictions in terms of architecture or parameters likely to result from this proposed version of OXCI imposed upon a signature technology of an EFSP, court, or law firm signer?