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> After over 18 months
> of close scrutiny, no one has been able to report any architectural flaw in
> either the ASN.1 notation or any of the standard encoding rules, which might
> have increased the risk of program misbehavior. The standards are innocent.
That's a pretty broad claim to make, and I'm not so sure I'd go along
with that. I could imagine playing some interesting games with
indefinite-form length (or tag) values that get something "interesting"
to happen because they cause wrap-around or (for lengths) make the
system consume gobs of memory, hang in a network read waiting for the
infinite data that will never come, etc. Did the scrutinizers think of
those things?
In my experience, fixing "too long" errors for XML parsers has to happen
in only one place. Fixing them for ASN.1/[BDP]ER parsers requires
fixing it every time you nest a structure or list.
/r$
--
Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect
DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com
XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html
XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html
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