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layers on layers...
a box at the perimeter simply becomes the target.
this is the same problem as trying to stop junk snail mail. if you've
got a letterbox, you'll get it.
i'm not talking about spam here - although it's largely the same
problem. if you've got a publicly accessible service, you can't stop the
public accessing it.... and if they abuse it - spam, DoS (and frineds
DDoS etc) all you can do is try to limit the abuse.
that's simply because you can't tell the friendlies until you look at
the content.
now if you could tell what's coming before it got here, that would be
good.
rick
On Fri, 2004-02-06 at 09:03, Bullard, Claude L (Len) wrote:
> Thanks Chris. That is certainly interesting as well
> s the other research he is doing. In discussing the
> DDoS challenge with engineers here, I hear similar
> proposals (that is, as much as I can determine from
> the short description of 'anycast') where a box
> at the perimeter shields the rest of the network.
> If he has a generalized solution, that sounds
> like a money maker.
>
> I would think these issues would be of some concern
> to an industry obsessed with web services. Currently,
> we keep them in the Intranet and are very careful to
> assess any kind of service that is on the Internet
> with regards to criticality. We can do that. I
> have to wonder about industries that have some
> wide-eyed vision of 'seamlessness' and 'just in time'.
> It seems like driving ahead of the headlights.
>
> len
>
>
> From: Chris Wilper [mailto:cwilper@cs.cornell.edu]
>
> Maybe something on the horizon from Paul Francis (the NAT guy):
>
> ". . . The IP Internet was simply not designed to repel this kind of attack.
> We are looking at an architecture for an anycast-based DDoS perimeter than
> can be incrementally deployed at the edge of the network. In this
> architecture, IP anycast is used to force packets to travel through the
> boxes
> that constitute the perimeter, thus protecting servers from direct attack.
> We believe that this architecture can be extended to provide DDoS protection
> to all Internet users."
> http://www.cs.cornell.edu/People/francis/
>
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